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Abstract
Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gelman and Salop (1983) are best remembered
for their neat conclusions: a limited quality or limited capacity is an effective tool
to relax competition and facilitate entry in a market. We aim at comparing the
respective merits of these two strategic commitments. We claim that capacity limi-
tation is more effective than quality reduction, mainly because it acts directly upon
the incumbent to reduce his aggressiveness in the final price competition whereas
quality tools works indirectly trough consumer’s willingness to pay.
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1 Introduction
The fact that many industries feature one or few dominant firms and a fringe of small
competitors has been nicely formalized by Gelman and Salop (1983): in order to relax
price competition andmake entry profitable, an entrant can use a carrot and stick strat-
egy. She voluntarily limits her production capacity to guarantee a large residual demand
for the incumbent but she names a low price that would prove dear to undercut. In their
discussion of possible means to achieve this credible commitment, the authors claim
that “producing a product with limited consumer appeal is analogous to capacity limi-
tation”.
It is indeed true that a similar strategic commitment is at work in themodels of qual-
ity differentiation of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982): the
entrant optimally chooses a low quality and offers a substantial rebate on her product
in order to induce the incumbent not to fight too aggressively in prices. The incumbent
therefore prefers to accomodate entry although its is always possible for him to exclude
the entrant from the market.
In this note wemix the two previous strand of literature by considering a game of en-
try where the entrant is allowed to choose the quality of its product and its production
capacity. The question we raise is the following: does the entrant use product differ-
entiation and capacity precommitment simultaneously? We show in Theorem 1 that
under efficient rationing, quality imitation coupled with an optimal capacity limitation
is more effective than having a large production capacity and a low quality. Even if dif-
ferentiation occurs, it is limited and the product of quality by capacity remains equal to
the optimal capacity limitation.
2 Themodel
We follow the Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework for modelling quality differentiation
and consider a continuum of consumers identified by their type x which is uniformly
distributed in [0;1]. The utility of a consumer with type x is sx − p should he buy one
unit of product of quality s at price p and 0 should he refrain from buying. Consumers
maximize their utility and when indifferent between the two products, they select their
purchase randomly.
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We study the following 3 stages gameG :
• At t = 0, an incumbent i enters the market and selects some top quality si = 1 and
a large capacity ki = 1.
• At t = 1, an entrant e selects its quality se = s ≤ 1 and capacity ke = k ≤ 1.
• At t = 2, firms compete simultaneously in prices. Our solution concept for the
gameG(s,k) is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Quality cost is assumed nil as well as the cost of production up to the capacity limit
and equal to +∞ otherwise. Observe that two classes of price subgames might be gen-
erated by choices made at t = 1: either k = 1 and we face a standard game of vertical
differentiation or k < 1 and we face a Bertrand-Edgeworth gamewith (possibly) product
differentiation.
Consumers make their choice at the last stage by comparing xsi −pi , xs−pe and
0. In the presence of differentiation (s < 1), it is a straightforward exercice to show that
demands are given by
Di (pi ,pe ) =

0 iff pi ≥ pe +1− s
1− pi−pe1−s iff
pe
s ≤ pi ≤ pe + (1− s)
1− pisi iff pi ≤
pe
s
(1)
De (pi ,pe ) =

0 iff pe ≥ pi s
pi−pe
1−s −
pe
s iff pi −1+ s ≤ pe ≤ pi s
1− pes iff pe ≤ pi −1+ s
(2)
When capacity is not an issue (k = 1) andproducts are differentiated (s < 1), Lehmann-
Grube (1997) shows that firms best replies are continuous and given by:
φi (pe ) =

pe+1−s
2 iff pe ≤ 1−s2−s s
pe
s iff
1−s
2−s s ≤ pe ≤ s2
1
2 iff pe ≥ s2
(3)
φe (pi ) =

pi s
2 iff pi ≤ 2(1−s)2−s
pi −1+ s iff 2(1−s)2−s ≤ pi ≤ 1− s2
s
2 iff pi ≥ 1− s2
(4)
These best replies are displayed on Figure 1 and the equilibrium is summarized in
Lemma 1 below.
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Figure 1: The price space with unlimited capacity
Lemma 1 For s < 1, the game G(s,1) has a unique pure strategy equilibrium: p∗i = 2(1−s)4−s
and p∗e = s(1−s)4−s .
Corollary 1 The optimal quality for the entrant in the class of pricing games
{G(s,1), s < 1} is s∗ = 47 yielding the profit pi∗e = 148 .
Notice that the pricing gameG(1,1) is a classical Bertrand game with linear demand
D(p)= 1−p. In case of a price tie, demand is shared equally by the two firms.
2.1 Rationing and Sales
Whenever the entrant has unlimited capacity (k = 1), sales are equal to demand as char-
acterized by equations (1) and (2). However, if the entrant has build a limited capacity
(k < 1), there will exist some pairs of prices (pe ,pi ) such that De (pe ,pi ) > k. In such
cases, some consumers will be rationed and possibly report their purchase on firm the
incumbent. In order to characterize firms’ sales in that situation, we must specifiy the
particular rationing rule that prevails in the market.
H 1 Efficient rationning is at work whenener k <De (.).
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Under (H1), consumers who are ultimately rationed are those exhibiting the lowest
willingness to pay for the rationed good. The limited k units sold by the entrant will be
contested by potential buyers,1 the price pe paid for them will rise to the level pe where
the excess demandDe (pe ,pi )−k vanishes i.e.,
pi −pe
1− s −
pe
s
= k (5)
from which we obtain
pe = (pi −k(1− s))s (6)
Now, usingDi = 1− pi−pe1−s from (1) and (6), we obtain the residual demand addressed
to the incumbent firm as
Dri (pi )= 1−ks−pi . (7)
The expressions for the sales functions are therefore:
Se (pi ,pe ) =

0 iff pe ≥ pi s
pi−pe
1−s −
pe
s iff pe ∈
[
max
{
pi − (1− s),pe
}
;pi s
]
1− pes iff pe ∈
[
s(1−k);pi − (1− s)
]
k iff pe ≤min
{
pe , s(1−k)
} (8)
Si (pi ,pe ) =

0 iff pi ≥ pe + (1− s)
1−ks−pi iff pi ∈
[ pe
s +k(1− s);pe + (1− s)
]
1− pi−pe1−s iff pi ∈
[ pe
s ;
pe
s +k(1− s)
]
1− pisi iff pi ≤
pe
s
(9)
where branch (9:b) is void if pe > s(1−k).
2.2 Price Best Responses
Whenever k < 1, the analysis of G(k, s) must take into account the possibility that firms
sales are respectively given by equations (9:b) and (8:d). Suppose the entrant’s capacity
is binding, then it is immediate to see that the best she can do is to sell her capacity
at the highest price, which is pe = (pi − k(1− s))s. On the other hand, whenever the
1We implicitely assume that a secondary market opens where consumers may take advantage of the
arbitrage possibilities at no cost.
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incumbent plays along segment (9:b), he maximizes profits by setting p i ≡ 1−ks2 , and
obtains a minmax profit equal to pii ≡ (1−ks)
2
4 .
Given the incumbent’s price pi , the entrant’s payoff function remains concave in
own prices (in the domain whereDe (.)≥ 0). The best response function is now given by
BRe (pi ,k)=

pi s
2 iff pi ≤ 2k(1− s)
pe iff 2k(1− s)≤ pi ≤min
{
1− s2 ,1−ks
}
pi −1+ s iff 1−ks ≤ pi ≤ 1− s2
max
{ s
2 , s(1−k)
}
iff pi ≥min
{
1− s2 ,1−ks
} (10)
On Figure 2 we illustrate the case k > 12 (in the other case, the third branch of (10)
vanishes).
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Figure 2: The price space with binding capacity
As should appear from the inspection of Si (pe ), the payoff of firm i is likely to be
non-concavewhenwe passes from segment (9:b) to (9:c). Accordingly, the best response
to pe might be non-unique. Solving pii
(
pe+1−s
2 ,pe
)
=pii for pe , we obtain:
pˆe (s,k)≡
p
1− s
(
1−ks−p1− s
)
(11)
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which is represented on Figure 2. Yet, it might also be the case that pii > pii ( pe+1−s2 ,pe )
over the whole domain where φi (pe ) is defined by equation (3:a). In this case we must
compute firm i ’s payoff along segment (3:b). Solving pes
(
1− pes
)=pii for pe , we obtain:
p˜e (s,k)≡ s
2
(
1−
√
ks(2−ks)
)
(12)
Last, to know when one case or the other applies, we solve pˆe = p˜e to obtain:
h(s)≡ 1
s
(
1− 2
p
1− s
2− s
)
(13)
Depending on the value of the capacity k, we might therefore obtain two different
shapes for the best response of the incumbent firm in the pricing game:
• if k ≥ h(s), then
BRi (pe )=

1−ks
2 iff pe ≤ pˆe
pe+1−s
2 iff pˆe < pe ≤ 1−s2−s s
pe
s iff
1−s
2−s s ≤ pe ≤ s2
1
2 iff pe ≥ s2
(14)
• if k ≤ h(s), then
BRi (pe )=

1−ks
2 iff pe ≤ p˜e
pe
s iff p˜e < pe ≤ s2
1
2 iff pe ≥ s2
(15)
The critical values pˆe and p˜e therefore identify the price level at which firm i is in-
different between naming the security price p i = 1−ks2 or naming a lower price which
ensures a larger market share. The resulting discontinuity is likely to destroy the exis-
tence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
2.3 Price Equilibrium
We analyze the Nash equilibria for each price subgame G(s,k). Let us first deal with a
particular class of subgames where s = 1. In this case, the vertical differentiation model
degenerates into a Bertrand-Edgeworth competition for an homogenous product. Lev-
itan and Shubik (1972) analyze this game under the efficient rationing hypothesis H1
and derive the following result whose proof is given in appendix.
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Lemma 2 For s = 1 and under H1, there always exists a unique price equilibrium in
which the entrant earns exactly kp˜e (1,k). Furthermore the maximum of this payoff is
pi†e ≡ 34 − 1p2 ' 0.043 and is reached for k
† ≡ 1− 1p
2
' 0.293.
When products are differentiated and one firm faces a capacity constraint, the exis-
tence of a price equilibrium is not problematic since payoffs are continuous (the Nash
existence theoremapplies). Moreover, there exists quality-capacity constellationswhere
a pure strategy equilibrium exists. More precisely, the pure strategy equilibrium prevail-
ing in the limiting case where k = 1 is preserved. Let us define g (s) ≡ 1− 4
p
1−s
4−s and
notice for later use that g (s)> h(s)⇔ 16s2 (1− s)+ s4 (3+ s)> 0 which is always true over
the relevant domain.
Lemma 3 For s < 1 and under H1, p∗i = 2(1−s)4−s and p∗e = s(1−s)4−s is a pure strategy equilib-
rium in the pricing subgames whenever k ≥ g (s).
Proof The well known candidate equilibrium (p∗i ,p
∗
i ) is found using equations (9)
and (8) (it is illustrated on Figure 1). Next, we identify the conditions under which p∗i
is indeed a best response to p∗e . To this end we only have to solve p∗e ≥ pˆe ; straightfor-
ward computations yield the condition k ≥ g (s) and since g (s)> h(s), pˆe was indeed the
benchmark to use. 
Whenever k < g (s), a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. For intermediate capac-
ities, it is easy to identify a particular equilibrium in which the incumbent randomizes
over two atoms while the entrant plays the pure strategy pˆe . However, there also ex-
ists a domain of small capacities where even this equilibrium fails to exist. When this
is the case, both firms use non-degenerate mixed strategy in equilibrium. The equilib-
rium strategy used by firm j in equilibrium ofG(k, s) is denoted F j ; the lower bound and
upper bound of the support of F j are denoted respectively by p−j and p
+
j .
Lemma 4 Let k < g (s) and s < 1. In equilibriumofG(k, s), p+i ≤ 1−ks2 and p+e ≤BRe
(
1−ks
2
)
.
Proof: The proof proceeds by iteration. Observe firstly that the monopoly price 12
is an upper bound for p+i because at any pi > 12 , pii (pi ,pe ) is decreasing in pi , thus the
average pii (pi ,Fe ) is also decreasing in pi which proves that such a price cannot belong
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to the support of Fi . Using this result and the expression of firm e’s best response, we
may eliminate the range of prices pe which lie above the best response to pi = 12 (check
on Figure 2 ). Within the remaining range of price pe , wemay further restrict the domain
of prices used by firm i in equilibrium by using the expression of φi (.). Reiterating the
process, we end up with p+i ≤ 1−ks2 and p+e ≤BRe
(
1−ks
2
)
. 
Lemma 5 Let k < g (s). In equilibrium of G(k, s), p+i = 1−ks2 and the equilibrium payoff is
the minimax pii .
Proof When k < g (s) it is true that 2k(1− s)< p¯i = 1−ks2 . This implies that BRe (p¯i )=
p¯e so that pii (pi ,Fe ) = pi (1− ks − pi ) in a neighborhood of p¯i . Now, if p+i < p¯i , then
pii (pi ,Fe ) is strictly increasing over
]
p+i ; p¯i
[
which implies that p+i cannot be part of an
equilibrium strategy for the incumbent.2 Hence, it must be true that p+i = 1−ks2 and
since the equilibrium payoff can be computed at any price in the support of Fi , we have
pii (p+i ,Fe )= p+i (1−ks−p+i )= (1−ks)
2
4 =pii . 
Lemma 6 Let k < g (s). In equilibrium of G(k, s), p−e ≤ pˆe if k ≥ h(s) and p−e ≤ p˜e if
k ≤ h(s). The entrant’s equilibrium payoff is bounded from above by kpˆe (s,k) if k > kˆe (s)
and by kp˜e (s,k) if k ≤ h(s).
Proof: Let us consider first the case k < h(s). If p−e > p˜e then for any pi < p
−
e
s , the
incumbent’s demand is monopolistic whatever pe ≥ p−e . Hence, pii (pi ,Fe ) = pi (1− pi )
is strictly increasing, which means the lower of the mixed strategy Fi cannot belong to
this area, necessarily p−i ≥
p−e
s . If p
−
i =
p−e
s , then at p
−
i , the incumbent is a monopoly
whatever pe ≥ p−e , thus pii (p−i ,Fe ) = p−i (1−p−i ) =
p−e
s
(
1− p−es
)
> p˜es
(
1− p˜es
)
= (1−ks)24 = pii
by definition of p˜e and by the previous lemma. This inequality is a contradiction with
p−i being in the support of Fi . If p
−
i >
p−e
s , then pii (p
−
i ,Fe ) ≥ pii (p−e /s,Fe ) since p−i is an
2If p+i < 2k(1− s), then the previous argument does not apply because Si is not always 1−ks−pi . How-
ever, if this case occurs then the entrant’s demand, when facing Fi , is always of the duopolistic kindwithout
capacity constraint, hence his best reply is the pure strategy φe computed at the average of pi . Since the
pure strategy equilibrium does not exists over the present domain, the incumbentmust be playing amixed
strategy and the only candidate when the entrant plays a pure strategy involves playing the security price
p¯i , a contradiction with p
+
i < p¯i .
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optimal price and p−e /s is not; observing that pii (p−e /s,Fe ) = p
−
e
s
(
1− p−es
)
, the previous
argument applies.
The second claim is a simple consequence of the fact that the equilibriumpayoff can
be computed at any price in the support of Fe , hence
pie (p
−
e ,Fi )= p−e
∫
Se (p
−
e ,pi )dFi (pi )≤ kp−e
since sales are bounded by the capacity. The case for k ≥ h(s) is identical since the
benchmark p˜e and pˆe play a symmetric role. 
Although we do not have a full characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium in
all possible subgames, we have derived enough to state:
Theorem 1 An optimal quality-capacity pair is s = 1 and k = k†. Other optimal pairs
necessarily satisfy s ≥ s¯ ≡ 2(p2−1)' 0.83 and satisfy sk = k†.
Proof For k < h(s), pie (Fe ,Fi )≤ kp˜e (s,k)= ks2
(
1−pks(2−ks)) which is a function of
the product x = ks, whose maximum is reached for x = k†, yields an overall maximum
pi†e . It then remains to observe that this is precisely the optimal quality and themaximum
entrant’s payoff for s = 1 and k = k† as shown in Lemma 2. The corresponding point is
indicated on Figure 3 on the right border of the box. The maximum payoff over the
domain s < 1 and k < h(s) is therefore dominated by that inG(k†,1).
A likewise analysis applies for s < 1 and k ∈ [h(s);g (s)]. The upper bound kpˆe (s,k)=
k
p
1− s (1−ks−p1− s)when analyzed as a function defined over [0;1]×[0;1] reaches its
maximum for k = 1−
p
1−s
2s . Replacing by the optimal value and simplifying, the objective
is now
p
1−s(1−p1−s)2
4s and its maximum is achieved for s = s¯ which leads to the optimal
capacity k = k†/s ' 0.35 and profit pi†e . This pair satisfies k = h(s) i.e., is on the h curve
as indicated on Figure 3. The entrant’s profit for k ∈ [h(s);g (s)] is thus lesser than the
upper bound whose maximum is pi†e .
Finally, for s < 1 and k ≥ g (s), the optimum strategy is to differentiate with s∗ = 47 to
earn pi∗e = 148 ' 0.021 < pi†e ' 0.043. Overall, s = 1 and k = k† is an optimal strategy pair;
there might other optimal strategies satisfying ks = k† but they all give the same final
payoff. 
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Figure 3: Strategy Space
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Let Fe and Fi be the equilibrium cumulative distributions, assuming
no mass except at the end points. Due to the nature of demand, the entrant gets all
demand if her price p is the lowest i.e., with probability Fi (p), her payoff is thuspie = (1−
Fi )pmin
{
k,1−p} . Likewise the incumbent’s is pii = p (1−p−Femin{k,1−p}). Bottom
prices have to be the same because otherwise one profit would be strictly increasing
in between (all prices are lesser than the monopoly one) and this would contradict the
equilibrium definition.
At the common bottom price pl , Fi = 0 and 1−pl > k, thus pie = kpl . The entrant’s
top price cannot be greater than the incumbent’s one because pie would be zero, hence
at the top price ph , Fe = 1. If there was no rationing at ph then pii would be zero, thus
1− ph > k and pii = ph
(
1−ph −k
)
. Furthermore the right derivative must be nega-
tive to make sure than no other greater price is better, hence ph ≥ 1−k2 . We also have
Fe (p)= 1−p−pii /pk (recall that 1−p > k over the whole interval) thus the density must be
fe (p) = 1k
(
pii /p2−1
)
. Being positive, we derive p2 ≤ pii = ph
(
1−ph −k
)
and applying
this inequality at the top price, we get ph ≤ 1−k2 . combining with the reverse inequality,
we obtain ph = 1−k2 , so that pii = (1−k)
2
4 . Now, at the bottom price pii = pl (1− pl ), thus
pl = 12
(
1−pk(2−k)) and pie . 
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